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China In the 21st Century: Will ICT Sustain
Economic Growth?
James W. Gabberty, (E-Mail: JGabberty@Pace.edu)
Linda Jo Calloway, (E-mail: LCalloway@Pace.edu)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate critical thinking about China’s ability to consistently grow its
economy by leveraging its information and communication (ICT) infrastructure in such as way as to prolong the
competitive advantage it now enjoys from its ability to attract multinational corporations (MNCs) attention. The
success of China’s transition towards economic and societal advancement is underpinned, to a large extent, by its
total ICT investment. A competitive ICT profile is an antecedent to innovation, making China’s intention to become
a significant force in the global knowledge economy more viable. This paper interprets current evaluations of
China’s innovation circumstances in light of factual and perceptual data that represents the nation’s ICT
capabilities in the context of its standings with other nations.
Introduction
In the popular book, “Globalization and Its Discontents”, author and 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics
Science Joseph Stiglitz outlined many of the reasons why globalization has become so controversial. He concludes,
among other well-cited positations, that countries that embrace international trade improve their economies more
than they would otherwise, and that export-led growth is the centerpiece of the industrial policy that enriched Asia
and “left millions of people there far better off” (Stiglitz, 2002). The recent rise to prominence by China,
characterized by massive foreign-funded investments in manufacturing capacity and information & communication
technologies (ICT) linking Chinese production centers with Japanese and Western multinational corporations
(MNCs), appears to illustrate his central thesis.
The question that remains for China, for the purposes of this study, is whether Chinese manufacturers can
continue to weave their firms (and the nation’s pool of educated workers) into the global supply chain, achieving
sustainable competitive advantage. Once accomplished, additional value added opportunities leading toward further
innovation within China may occur. A parallel can be drawn between the point in time where China is today and
where Mexico was just prior to joining NAFTA. Approximately 10 years ago, the framework laid out by the
NAFTA terms made it possible for Mexico to achieve a similar weaving of its workers into the (mostly U.S.) value
chain. The Mexican economy, as expected, improved greatly during the late 1990s and despite having achieved
some competitive advantage, this advantage was nonetheless lost when China opened its doors wide to (mostly U.S.
and European) foreign manufacturing activity. Currently, Mexico is mired in economic morass, nostalgically
looking backward into its recent past for insight as to what could have been done to prevent losing its competitive
advantage. China, on the other hand, is at a point in its upward-spiraling economic development (when comparisons
to the Mexican example may be made) as that country strives to nurture its nascent economic development to escape
repeating the fate that befell Mexico.
This is a difficult task for China to achieve, since it is straddled with concurrent burdens of steering its
economy in the right direction, educating and training its workers, and rolling out an advanced ICT infrastructure
that will achieve an economic payoff in future business opportunities with the rest of Asia and the West. The
resulting challenge of coping with related issues that strain this development are many and include (1) the danger of
creating an overheated economy (numerous signs of which have become manifest), (2) addressing internal
infrastructural problems created by the vast streams of workers leaving the hinterland in pursuit of the developed
coastal cities, and (3) carefully approaching monetarist policies to deal with calls by foreign leaders for the nation to
devalue its currency in preparation for a floating Yuan, which, at least in the short-term, is sure to slow economic
activity.

This paper assesses China’s predictability in achieving a sustained competitive advantage made possible, in
part, by leveraging the capabilities inherent in its ICT profile. Relying on ICT infrastructure factors compiled by the
World Bank and survey data from a report by the World Economic Forum, China’s standings relative to similar,
competing export-driven nations will be assessed.
China’s Position in the Global Knowledge Economy
As part of the plan to move the nation forward as a significant player in the emerging integrated knowledge
economies characterizing the 21st century, China’s declared strategy of expanding its manufacturing capacity
depends upon its ability to (a) update economic and institutional regimes, (b) upgrade education and learning, and
(c) create and deploy a sound information infrastructure (Dahlman & Aubert, 2001).
So far, China’s growth is unprecedented for an Asian economy. Its economic development has
mushroomed from an insular economy, leading the nation away from successive failing five-year plans to a level of
national advancement characterized by the moniker “socialist market economy”. By not repeating the "big bang"
approach adopted by Eastern European countries (e.g., Russia) when they attempted to achieve the same goal, China
is not in a rush to privatize its industries but is instead bent on opening itself to foreign investment and export-led
growth strategies. This feat of sustained economic development was made possible by building out its ICT
infrastructure to enable MNCs to interlink Chinese manufacturers into their manufacturing value chain.
The Pace of Change
By leveraging the nation’s low labor costs and the inherent knowledge gains made possible by building an
ICT infrastructure promoting shared and collaborative production capabilities, China gained competitive advantage
over other similar developing nations (Stiglitz, 2002). Further, the pace at which nations such as China open
themselves up to the international economy is quickening (globalization is the catchphrase for this manifestation)
and is accelerating as other nations try to catch up, despite the allegations that free trade, the free flow of capital, and
rapid economic growth widen the income gaps in society (Larsson, 2001). This rate of change is so startling to
industry and government leaders that recent protectionist calls by top executives in the public and private sector
(notably the United States) cite that this fast pace of globalization wreaks havoc on national economies because they
are unable to respond quickly enough to handle the impact that China has on their local economies. Because of this
frenzied pace of leveraging ICT assets to gain superior production and marketing capabilities (Gabberty, 2004),
improvements in telecommunications, interoperability among disparate computing platforms, the “commoditization”
of the Internet, and advances in automated manufacturing and CRM software result in quickening the tempo of the
beat toward globalization, further simplifying the ease with which manufacturing and service sector processing may
be moved to offshore facilities in foreign locales.
Geographic Challenges
For the most part, China’s economic miracle is taking place in the coastal cities, more or less following
Porter’s work on clustering manufacturing centers (Porter, 1990). As such, China’s endogenous formation and
internal sharing of knowledge, made possible by network clusters, results in spatially clustered firms that sustain
technological innovation (see Hicks & Niven, 2000). Accordingly, then, the challenge is to create technology
innovation centers throughout China’s urban areas. There is some justification to considering Coastal China as a
developed economy, albeit currently one of manufacturing. Based on the work of Dewan and Kraemer (2000) an
innovation policy that limits IT capital investments to developed coastal areas could be justified. Using this
scenario, China’s ICT investment blueprint would be based on treating rural China as a developing economy and
coastal China as a developed one. Dewan and Kraemer found evidence that for developed countries there can be a
clear positive and significant structure of returns for IT capital investment commensurate with the relative factor
share.
The Lowest Labor Cost Supplier
While low labor cost nations such as China enjoy the recent economic stimulus made possible by weaving
themselves into the production supply chains of (mostly) Japanese and Western MNCs, it remains to be seen how
long their ability to respond to changes in product demands will last. After all, the global workforce expansion

unfolding over the past twenty years has made it possible for new entrants to gain access to this supply chain
through comparatively lower labor costs. Foreign MNCs, driven by a never ending pursuit of lowered production
costs and higher profit margins do not necessarily owe any particular allegiance to their suppliers but instead owe
allegiance only to shareholders.
Eventually, the increased economic growth in China will lead to an appreciating currency, triggering
reflexive monetarist intervention policies that mimic Japan’s pattern of continually devaluing their currency in order
to keep exports attractive and promote the manufacturing centers. For example, recent calls by U.S. Treasury
Secretary Andrew Snow to Chinese counterparts to let the Yuan float on international currency markets will
eventually lead to its appreciation and cause a rise in the costs of doing business in China.
When this devaluation occurs, several questions become apparent:
1.

How will China be able to sustain its competitive posture in the global economy?

2.

Will it be able to leverage its ICT infrastructure in new and innovative ways to continue attracting inflows
of foreign investment?

3.

Will it instead continue to rely on its current competitive advantage - that of being the lowest-priced labor
source (following the Mexican example)?

The answers to these questions prove elusive at best. However, finding solutions to them before they
become problematic will help divert China away from what noted U.S. Business and Industry Council research
fellow Alan Tonelson refers to as the “race to the bottom”, led by uncontrolled free trade and sinking American
(and, ultimately Chinese) living standards (Tonelson, 2002).
Avoiding Export Dependency
Hence, China needs to innovate, as did the U.S. in the last half of 20th century, specializing in information
and communication technologies. The unquestioned ICT supremacy that the U.S. enjoys allows it to distribute its
production and manufacturing centers throughout the world, driven by various factors that offer competitive
advantage. From this perspective, China’s factories are merely remote nodes of this international grid; Chinese
leaders seem content in having established the nation as one of the world’s most prominent workshops. However,
the infrastructural components that comprise these manufacturing linkages may have unforeseen consequences
(Spencer, 2003).
Also, since MNCs intrinsically have the ability to extend their competitive advantage beyond borders, they
offer China the opportunity to tap into a wealth of technological know-how via knowledge transfer agreements that
will serve them in the future. Specifically, infrastructural technologies in particular can be viewed as critical
components of competitive advantage because of the higher implicit value they offer compared to components used
in isolation (Carr, 2003).
Innovation requires an innovative infrastructure, and in today’s world, in the context of China’s plans, the
substrate of innovation is ICT capability. From a national perspective, China’s need to innovate resonates with the
basic tenets of competitiveness espoused by Michael Porter, co-chair of the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR),
an annual ranking produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) of the competitiveness and growth prospects of
80 countries. As international trade flourishes, competitiveness increases and innovation becomes paramount. Porter
believes that innovation is what drives and sustains competitiveness (Porter, 1990). Moreover, he posits that there is
no sustainable growth possible without technological improvements, because other potential determinants of growth
eventually suffer diminishing returns. As put aptly by the WEF GCR for 2001 – 2002, there are no diminishing
returns on ideas.

Evaluating China’s ICT Capabilities Relative to Competing Nations
China realizes the need to keep its ICT sophistication on an upward trajectory; however, this upward path
may be dampened by the capabilities and perceived capacity of other countries that compete with China in
international trade. From this perspective, China’s continued economic expansion is not guaranteed.
A recent study by Gabberty and Calloway (2004) analyzed the relative rankings of China compared with
various nations to elicit those ICT-related metrics that may impede China in its drive toward manufacturing
innovation. Within this research stream, this paper extends the analysis of these ICT readiness component measures
to further illuminate the effects of these data on China’s readiness to innovate and interleaves analyses of
quantitative indicator components from the World Bank. The specific countries included in this study were selected
for comparison from two country groupings: The National Asia Pacific Economic and Scientific Database (NAPES,
2001) and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) from the WEF. The NAPES database is a comprehensive
repository of long-term economic indicators for the Asia-Pacific region covering bilateral trade, economic and
industrial research and development, and patents. The country selection criteria for those nations included in the
NAPES database are simply those nations that have embarked on a path of economic development through trade;
they are listed in table I.
The current study principally examines China’s ICT capabilities with respect to its export-driven economic
expansion goals, and therefore the NAPES country set is most appropriate. The 41 countries in the NAPES set are
used to compare and analyze China’s competitive position regarding ICT readiness both for the quantitative
comparisons with the World Bank indicators and for the perceptual comparisons using the WEF-GCI measures. The
Gabberty & Calloway (2004) study isolated forty-eight components that specifically characterize various aspects of
ICT capability in China as observed by key executives surveyed in the WEF-GCR. The study ranked China in both
the WEF-GCI country set and the NAPES country set to differentiate which components were ranked at least 10%
lower in the export-driven NAPES country set, and that were also more than one standard deviation below the mean
response for the component. This current study interprets these results in light of China’s current competitive
positioning, ICT development initiatives, and measured tangible assets as reported by the World Bank. This study
also extracts those components and tangible asset capabilities that position China for ICT ascendancy in the ranks of
export-driven countries. .
Faced with the problem of devising a set of components to measure ICT development in China from
multiple dimensions, this research parallels the methods used by other authors; e.g., (Bui et al., 2002) by selecting
relevant metrics from existing data. Also, to mitigate the challenges presented by multiple data sources (each with
their own measurement criteria and inherent shortcomings), the study instead takes the approach of using a singular
data source, namely, the metrics available from the WEF GCR. Thus, this approach eliminates inconsistent and
overlapping measurements.
A second challenge of the study dealt with the problem of selecting which individual measures should be
included. For example, three of the broader categories (namely, Macroeconomic Environment, Public Institutions
[Corruption], and Environmental) are not significantly tied to ICT capabilities. To distill the remaining category
components (specifically, Technology Innovation & Diffusion, Information and Communications Technology,
General Infrastructure, Public Institutions [Contracts and Law], Domestic Competition, Cluster Development,
Company Operations & Strategy), the relevance of each sub-component was determined, and those deemed most
suitable were selected. The selected components are in Appendix A.

NAPES COUNTRIES
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
BelgiumLuxembourg
Canada
Chile
China
Denmark
Finland
France

Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary

Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands

Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland

Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan

New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Singapore

Thailand
Taiwan
Turkey
UK
US
Vietnam

Table I
Source: Adapted from National Asia Pacific Economic and Scientific Database, http://napes.anu.edu.au/

Since survey data is inherently ordinal and differences in the minds of the respondents are expected to exist
among different Likert scale values, rating scores were normalized using the following method, based on the number
of standard deviations that the rating score was away from the mean.
The means and standard deviations for every component relative to each country set was computed,
resulting in a data set whose coarser granularity is more likely to reflect actual differences among the various
country rating scores. The standard deviation for the country sets was added to or subtracted from each rating score.
If this modified score was greater than the mean value of the set plus one standard deviation, it was assigned a score
of ‘3’. If it was less than the average value minus one standard deviation, it was assigned a score of ‘1’. Otherwise, it
was assigned a default score of ‘2’ (see table II).

METHODLOGY FOR RATING ASSIGNMENT
If Component Mean + Standard Deviation > = rating score, assign a ‘3’
If Component Mean – Standard Deviation < = rating score, assign a ‘1’
Otherwise, assign a ‘2’.
Table II
Although the data reported in the WEF survey are perceptual, responses based on perception are assumed
to reflect an individual’s state of mind (Frake, 1966). An individual’s intentions have been shown to be the
antecedents for behavior (Ajzen, 2002; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). It is probable therefore to assume that these
executive perceptions will contribute toward intentions to behave similarly. Thus, these perceptions are likely
indicators of whether or not China is on a path toward ICT optimization.
According the Icek Ajzen (2002), one of the originators of the Theory of Planned Behavior, “As a general
rule, the more favorable the attitude and subjective norm, and the greater the perceived control, the stronger should
be the person’s intention to perform the behavior in question” (p 1). The formants of intention are described in
relation to technology acceptance by Venkatesh & Davis (2000) in the expanded Technology Acceptance Model
version 2.
The comparative study by Gabberty and Calloway (2004) revealed twelve ICT components that may put
China at a greater risk than previously identified in the nation’s efforts to move from an export-driven
manufacturing economy into a knowledge-based economy (see Appendix B). If the component factors in the study

had rating scores of ‘2’ for the WEF set and ‘1’ for the NAPES set; a value of ‘1’ indicates that the score is more
than one standard deviation below the mean. If the rankings were less than 10% apart the difference was considered
spurious and the component was dropped. For these twelve differentiated components, China ranked lower within
the set of export-driven economies competing against it in international trade.
The same twelve components emerge as critical factors that should be included in policy formulation by
top Chinese executives. These components also generally ranked China in the lowest 15th percentile, ranking below
35 out of 41 nations. More importantly, the extent of these disadvantages was hidden in the context of the larger,
more diverse WEF country set.
Implications of the Extracted Perceptual Factors: The Lower-rated Factors
In comparison with the NAPES countries, China’s rankings with respect to executive perceptions are
generally low. Of the 48 components measured, China ranks in the lowest 20 percent against most of the NAPES
export-driven nations. Twelve of the selected components, however, are remarkably low. Juxtaposed to the highly
acclaimed growth of China’s GDP, its first place ranking in Asia for foreign direct investment (FDI) and the nation’s
concurrent growth in per capita income, these ratings are strikingly glum.
Deterioration of the strength of public institutions is indicated by a total of five components (out of twelve)
used as barometers of the overall ICT capability in the Gabberty and Calloway report. The Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) report noted that China dropped in rankings from 38th to 44th within their 80-country dataset (as
opposed to the 75 countries in the WEF GCR); most of the drop was attributed to a lower perception of the quality
of public institutions. These five factors are shown below in table III.
EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
ICT Component

Executive Perception Rank (Percentile)

Laws relating to ICT use in electronic commerce,
digital signatures, & consumer protection
Intellectual property protection
The Quality of free public schools
The Quality of management schools
The Availability of scientists and engineers

Low 20th
Low 20th
Low 20th
Low 10th
Low 5th

Table III
Three of the twelve measures in the lowest 10th percentile pertain to overall Internet measures. Internet
access in China is slow and expensive; the extent that the Internet has improved domestic firms' ability to coordinate
with [domestic & international] customers and suppliers to reduce inventory costs is practically non - existent.
Lastly, competition in the telecommunications sector is not sufficient to ensure high quality of service (QoS) levels,
with a low mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) of critical system components that would lead to infrequent
interruptions, and or low Internet prices for businesses and consumers. These factors are summarized in table IV.
Some of the more dismal perceptions of executives seem to fly against the heavy FDI penetration into the
manufacturing sector. Production process sophistication placed in the lowest 25th percentile, IT Training and
Education Programs were rated in the lowest 5th percentile and the assessment of the executives’ companies’ extent
of staff training fell to the bottom-most 10th percentile, along with Buyer Sophistication.

EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNET CAPABILITIES
Executive Perception
Rank (Percentile)

ICT Component
Speed and cost of Lease-line or dial-up access to the Internet in China
Extent that Internet has improved the firms’ ability to coordinate with
customers & suppliers to lower inventory costs
Telecommunications sector competition’s sufficiency to ensure high
quality, infrequent interruptions and low prices

Low 10th
Low 10th
Low 7th

Table IV

Implications of the Extracted Perceptual Factors: The Higher-rated Factors
Of the 48 components selected from the WEF GCR report to represent perceived ICT capabilities in China,
seven components ranked above the mean for the NAPES country set. Significantly, all of these seven component
ratings represent China’s positive capacity for innovation (see Table V). Given that China is well on its way to
establishing itself as the world’s default light-manufacturing center, its ability to consistently lower production costs
through innovation remains paramount for the nations continued success. Because these seven factors where China
ranks above the mean are areas that gauge innovation, china’s ability to continue and indeed flourish in its pursuit of
serving as the world’s primary manufacturing center is entirely plausible.
EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING INNOVATION CAPABILITY
Government procurement of Advanced Technology Products are made to encourage innovation
Prioritization of ICT is perceived as Government a priority
Government Programs promoting the use of ICT are successful
In most industries competition in the local markets is perceived as good
Competition in the local market comes from local firms or local competitors
Entry of new competitors occurs in the local market
Companies do obtain technology by pioneering their own new products or processes
Table V
Executive expert opinion is used in these and similar rankings to assess the relative capabilities of countries
to compete in global markets and as previously noted, the opinions are considered as harbingers for executive action.
This suggests that these components are important in that they foretell a brighter possible future driven by
innovation.
Implications of the World Bank Indicators
Following the concept of ranking china against other countries in relation to ICT component measures, data
collected by the World Bank for the NAPES countries was used to extract factors where China ranked either in the
top ten countries or the bottom ten countries. Six of the hard data measures illustrate China’s objective position
against the export-driven countries of the NAPES database.
Implications of Lagging World Bank indicators
In some ICT categories, data from the World Bank places China among the lowest 25%, or among the
lowest 10 ranking of the 41 countries listed in the NAPES database of exporting nations.

China’s preoccupation with massive infrastructure projects (such as the Three Gorges Dam project and the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games) are tapping investment dollars that might otherwise have been put to use in extending
the nation’s ICT architecture. The nation’s ravenous appetite for imported raw materials serves as a reminder of the
enormity of the money being spent building up non-ICT infrastructure; for example, oil imports rose 30% in 2003,
second only to the U.S., China’s consumption of 50% of the world’s production of cement, 30% of its coal, and 36%
of its steel (Economist, February 1, 2004).
It is not surprising that China’s ICT expenditures as a percentage of GDP are not necessarily reflective of a
nation bent on ICT mastery. From a per capita perspective, China’s ICT spending does not bode any better (figure
I). The nation’s rank in the context of the NAPES countries is in between the Philippines and Thailand; China’s
besting of its three subordinate countries (Vietnam, India, and Indonesia) also does not signal that a brighter Chinese
future supported by ICT is likely.
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Figure I: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Expenditure
(Per capita, US$)
Source: Table IE.ICT.PCAP.CD, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

Figure II shows that the number of personal computers per thousand people places China ahead of
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Vietnam. This is surprising for a nation whose miraculous growth and
massive foreign investment did not necessarily translate into higher levels of personal computing availability for its
populous to leverage an increasingly knowledge-based global economy. Considering that according to World Bank
statistics, China’s foreign direct investment for 2001 stood at $44.2 billion, thirteen times that of India’s $3.4 billion,
it is disappointing that China’s PC usage is only four times that of India’s. Nevertheless, the low penetration of
personal computers resonates with China’s executives’ evaluation of slow and expensive Internet access and
deficient competition in the telecommunications sector.
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Source: Table IT.CMP.PCMP.P3, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

Discussion of Ascendant World Bank indicators
Placing in the top quartile of the NAPES database countries, China’s ability to export high technology
products (figure III) is a wonderful indicator of the nation’s ability to tap into its large, educated workforce and
collect revenues exceeding competitor nations such as the Netherlands, Malaysia, Ireland, and Mexico, approaching
the high technology export levels of Singapore, France, and the United Kingdom.
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Figure III: High Technology Exports
(Current Dollars, Billions US$)
Source: Table TX.VAL.TECH.CD, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

China’s ‘online’ population (figure IV) is illustrative of a nation whose inhabitants are ready to take on the
challenges posed by the “new economy”, even in the face of very low rankings within the NAPES country set for
several key internet components (see Table IV)
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Figure IV: Internet Users
(Millions)
Source: Table IT.NET.USER, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

From the perspective that China is likely to take a lead role in the global economy, perhaps one of the most
significant indicators to gauge is the number of personal computers installed in education (figure V). Approaching
parity with Japan, albeit having a population five times that of Japan, China is at least investing in technology that is
currently deployed in business the world over, especially the U.S. Assuming that the U.S. number of PCs in the
classroom is a barometer of how critically important this type of technology is to prepare future business leaders.

China appears to be mimicking the notion that personal computing is essential. Exceeding the installed base of each
European nation, China’s impressive PC initiative will likely provide a benefit to the country in the near future.
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Figure V: Personal Computers Installed in Education
(Thousands)
Source: Table IT.CMP.PCMP.ED, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

Concluding Comments
Since the mid 1990’s, China’s economy has soared, emerging from a third world developing nation to an
export-driven country offering access to a substantial low cost manufacturing base for many of the world’s premiere
multinationals. The MNCs, in pursuit of leveraging the investments made in ICT and other infrastructural programs,
have driven the volume of international trade and inflows of foreign direct investment to astonishing levels. Japan,
the former longstanding U.S. trade antagonist with huge trade surpluses with the U.S., has been supplanted by a
burgeoning China.
This research begins to assess whether or not China can continue to weave its manufacturing firms into the
global supply chain and to sustain their competitive position based on an innovation infrastructure that leverages
ICT by making possible abundant international trade to occur. Extensive research has and continues to be done to
track China’s economic meteoric trajectory and this research shows that sustained economic growth is predicated on
continuing to fostering innovation, largely based on ICT transfer and absorption. For China to avoid repeating the
mistakes of Mexico, another nation with a seemingly meteoric ascent to impressive trade output only to be outdone
by China, it must sustain its capacity to innovate by upgrading its education, learning and information infrastructure.
The responses of key executives surveyed by the WEF GCR portray China’s competitive position as
substantially below other nations with whom it competes. In fact, a previous analysis of China’s rankings among
export-driven nations by Gabberty and Calloway isolated 12 components where the China rank fell in the lowest 20th
percentile, or below 32 of 41 countries. Several of these components represented confidence in public institutions
such as the quality of public education and protection of intellectual property rights and consumer protection, while
other low ranking components represented cost, quality and competition in the Internet sector. The poorly perceived
or actual quality of public institutions in a communist state may hamper endogenous innovation. Further, if gaps in
IC
T support left by poor public institutional performance are closed by yet more involvement by wholly -owned
foreign enterprises, ICT absorption and innovation may be compromised if this technology transfer is not fully
absorbed.
Although the mean perceptions of China’s executives are remarkably low, the seven components with
measures above the mean all represented China’s positive capacity to innovate. These perceptions are in accord with
World Bank data illustrating that although personal computers (using per capita figures) places China in 37th out of
41 countries, the number of personal computers installed in education puts China in third, below only Japan and the
United States.

The positive implications for innovation drawn from these indicators is hopeful, and belies the notion that
China, along with its hosted MNCs are deriving benefit from China’s low-cost labor and high manufacturing
capacity at the expense of the nation’s deteriorating infrastructure and its power to sustain innovation.
Future Research Suggestions
China is poised at a crossroads: one path leads the nation to enlarging its infrastructure – fueled by inflows
of foreign capital and the other path advises cautionary containment of this continued growth. From the MNC
perspective, continue expansion of its manufacturing centers and (similar to India) development of a thriving service
sector are imperatives that will lead to increased profit streams for shareholders. From the consumer perspective
(both in China and elsewhere), China’s continued expansion will lead to lower-priced goods and (ultimately) higher
energy costs as fossil and coal fuel supplies dwindle. Finally, continued economic cooperation between China and
the rest of the world will lead to intensification of multilateral obligations and, in the long term, reduce the
likelihood of political friction with this nation that is attempting to become a successful Communist-led market
economy following the tenets of capitalism.
Subsequent research, fostering development of expressive thought and insight into the viability of bridging
these two opposing ideologies, is warranted, perhaps using as a starting points the speculations of noted Asian
author James Fallows (1994), illustrated in Appendix C.

Appendix A
SELECT ICT COMPONENTS THAT INFLUENCE NATIONAL EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
Category
Technological
innovation and
diffusion

Information and
communications
technology

Title

Description

Technological Sophistication

Your country's position in technology (1=generally lags behind most countries, 7= is among the world's leaders)

Firm-Level Innovation
Firm-Level Technology
Absorption
FDI and Technology Transfer
Company Spending on Research
and Development
Subsidies for Firm-Level
Research and Development
Tax Credits for Firm-Level
Research and Development
University/Industry Research
Collaboration
Government Procurement of
Advanced Technology Products
Availability of Scientists and
Engineers
Brain Drain

In your business, continuous innovation plays a major role in generating revenue (1=not true, 7=true)
Companies in your country are (1=not interested in absorbing new technology, 7=aggressive in absorbing new technology)

Speed and Cost of Internet
Access
Public Access to Internet

Foreign direct investment in your country (1=brings little new technology, 7=is an important source of new technology)
Companies' spending on research and development in your country (1=is non-existent, 7=is heavy relative to international
peers)
Direct government subsidies for firms conducting research and development in your country (1=never occur, 7=are widespread
and large)
Government tax credits for firms conducting research and development in your country (1=never occur, 7=are widespread and
large)
In its R&D activity, business collaboration with local universities is (1=minimal or non-existent, 7=intensive and ongoing)
Government decisions on the procurement of advanced technology products are based on (1=price alone, 7=technology and
encouraging innovation)
Scientists and engineers in your country are (1=non-existent or rare, 7=widely available)
Scientists and engineers in your country (1=normally leave to pursue opportunities elsewhere, 7=almost always remain in the
country)
Lease-line or dial-up access to the Internet in your country is (1=slow and expensive, 7=as fast and cheap as anywhere in the
world)

IT Training and Education

Public access to the Internet through libraries, post offices etc is (1=very limited, 7=pervasive -- most people have frequent
access)
Internet access in schools is (1=very limited, 7=pervasive -- most children have frequent access)
Is competition in your country's telecommunications sector sufficient to ensure high quality, infrequent interruptions and low
prices? (1=no, 7=yes, equal to world's best)
Highly skilled information technology workers in your industry (1=must leave the country to find good jobs, 7=have their pick
of well-paid, desirable jobs within the country)
Your country's IT training and educational programs (1=lag far behind most countries, 7=are among the world's best)

Quality of Competition in ISP

Is competition among your country's Internet Service Providers sufficient to ensure high quality, infrequent interruptions and

Internet Access in Schools
Quality of Competition in
Telecommunication Sector
High Skilled IT Job Market

Sector
Government Prioritization of
ICT
Government Success in ICT
Promotion
Government On-line Services
Laws Relating to ICT Use

General
infrastructure

Legal Framework for ICT
Development
Overall Infrastructure Quality
Quality of Public Schools
Telephone/Fax Infrastructure
Quality
Electricity Prices

Public
institutions:
contracts and law
Domestic
competition

Cluster
development

Intellectual Property Protection

Burden of Regulation
Intensity of Local Competition
Extent of Locally Based
Competitors
Entry into Local Markets
Buyer Sophistication
Local Supplier Quantity
State of Cluster Development
Extent of Product and Process
Collaboration
Local Availability of
Components and Parts
Local Availability of Process
Machinery

low prices? (1=no, 7=yes, equal to world's best)
Information and communications technologies are an overall government priority (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)
Government programs promoting the use of ICT are (1=not very successful, 7=highly successful)
On-line government services -- e.g. downloadable permit applications, tax payments -- in your country are (1=not available,
7=commonly available)
Laws relating to electronic commerce, digital signatures, and consumer protection are (1=non-existent, 7=well-developed and
enforced)
The legal framework in your country supports the development of IT businesses (1=no, strongly impedes, 7=yes, significantly
promotes)
General infrastructure in your country is (1=poorly developed and inefficient, 7=among the best in the world)
Public (free) schools in your country are (1=of poor quality, 7=equal to the best in the world)
New telephone lines for your business are (1=scarce and difficult to obtain, 7=widely available and highly reliable)
The price of electricity per kilowatt-hour in your country compared to international standards is (1=much higher, 7=among the
world's lowest)
Intellectual property protection in your country is (1=weak or non-existent, 7=equal to the world's most stringent)

Administrative regulations in your country are (1=burdensome, 7=not burdensome)
In most industries, competition in the local market is (1=limited and price-cutting is rare, 7=intense and market leadership
changes over time)
Competition in the local market comes primarily from (1=imports, 7=local firms or local subsidiaries of multinationals)
Entry of new competitors (1=almost never occurs in the local market, 7=is common in the local market)
Buyers in your country are (1=unsophisticated and choose based on the lowest price, 7=knowledgeable and demanding and buy
innovative products)
Local suppliers in your country are (1=largely non-existent, 7=numerous and include the most important materials,
components, equipment and services)
How common are clusters in your country? (1=clusters are limited and shallow, 7=clusters are common and deep)
Product and process development in your country is conducted (1=within companies or with foreign suppliers, 7=in
collaboration with local suppliers, customers & research institutions)
In your industry, components and parts are (1=almost always imported, 7=almost always sourced locally)
In your industry, process machinery is (1=almost always imported, 7=almost always sourced locally.

Company
operations and
strategy

Local Availability of Specialized
Research and Training Services
Local Availability of
Information Technology
Services
Value Chain Presence

In your industry, specialized research and training services are (1=not available in the country, 7=available from world-class
local institutions)
In your industry, specialized IT services are (1=not available in the country, 7=available from world-class local institutions)

Capacity for Innovation
Uniqueness of Product Designs
Production Process
Sophistication
Extent of Staff Training

Companies obtain technology (1=exclusively from foreign companies, 7=by pioneering their own new products or processes)
Product designs are (1=copied or licensed from abroad, 7=developed locally)
Production processes generally (1=use obsolete technology, 7=employ the world's best and most efficient technology)

Quality of Management Schools
Breadth of International Markets
Internet Effects on Business

Exporting companies in your country (1=are involved primarily in production, 7=conduct not just in production but also
product development, distribution and marketing)

In your country, companies general approach to human resources is to invest (1=little in training and development, 7=heavily
to attract, train and retain staff)
Management schools in your country are (1=limited and of poor quality, 7=among the world’s best)
Exporting companies from your country sell (1=primarily in a few foreign markets, 7= in virtually all international markets)
To what extent has the Internet improved your firm's ability to coordinate with customers and suppliers to reduce inventory
costs (1=no change, 7=huge improvement)

Appendix B
Category

Technological
innovation and
diffusion
Information and
communications
technology

General
Infrastructure
Public
institutions:
contracts and law
Cluster
development
Company Ops &
Strategy

Title

Difference in
rank: WEF
& NAPES

WEF
category

NAPES
category

NAPES
% rank
of 41

2

WEF
%
rank of
75
79

Availability of
Scientists & and
Engineers
Speed and Cost of
Internet Access

16%

Description

1

95

Scientists and engineers in your country are (1=non-existent or
rare, 7=widely available)

13%

2

77

1

90

Competition
Quality in
Telecomm
Sector
IT Training and
Education
Laws Relating to
ICT Use

16%

2

77

1

93

Lease-line or dial-up access to the Internet in your country is
(1=slow and expensive, 7=as fast and cheap as anywhere in the
world)
Is competition in your country's telecommunications sector
sufficient to ensure high quality, infrequent interruptions and low
prices? (1=no, 7=yes, equal to world's best)

11%

2

84

1

95

12%

2

71

1

83

Quality of Public
Schools
Intellectual
Property
Protection
Buyer
Sophistication
Production
Process
Sophistication
Extent of Staff
Training

14%

2

66

1

80

10%

2

80

1

90

23%

2

65

1

88

19%

2

56

1

75

Production processes generally (1=use obsolete technology,
7=employ the world's best and most efficient technology)

12%

2

78

1

90

Quality of Mgmt
Schools
Internet Effects on
Business

18%

2

72

1

90

10%

2

80

1

90

In your country, companies general approach to human resources
is to invest (1=little in training and development, 7=heavily to
attract, train and retain staff)
Management schools in your country are (1=limited and of poor
quality, 7=among the world’s best)
How has the Internet improved your firm's ability to coordinate
w/ customers & suppliers to lower inventory costs (1=no change,
7=huge improvement)

Your country's IT training and educational programs (1=lag far
behind most countries, 7=are among the world's best)
Laws relating to electronic commerce, digital signatures, and
consumer protection are (1=non-existent, 7=well-developed and
enforced)
Public (free) schools in your country are (1=of poor quality,
7=equal to the best in the world)
Intellectual property protection in your country is (1=weak or
non-existent, 7=equal to the world's most stringent)

Appendix C
There are many reasons why China is attempting to link itself to the free market democracies, which are
providing the necessary capital, knowledge, and expertise necessary to become a serious link in the chain of
globalization. When assessing these reasons however, a modicum of restraint is advised, since China inherently is an
Asian nation, not a Western one. Here are four frames of reference to frame one’s thinking about China from James
Fallows.i
1. The purpose of economic life in the American-style model is to raise the consumer's standard of living. In
the Asian model it is to increase the collective national strength. Ideally, the goal is to make the nation
independent and self-sufficient, so that it does not rely on outsiders for its survival. As such, China may not be
in a hurry to tie its destiny via ICT interlinks to Western (or even Japanese) counterparts. The American-style
goal is materialistic; the Asian-style goal is political.
2. The view of power in setting economic policies is starkly different: the Anglo-American ideology views
concentrated power as an evil whereas the Asian-style model views concentrated power as a fact of life. It has
developed elaborate systems for ensuring that the power is used for the long-term national good. So while the
central locus of control in China is collectively good and can be viewed as an asset in terms of moving quickly
on consensus for national projects like Internet access for its people, the geopolitical mindset of China does not
stop there but extends further in actually deciding what content gets filtered and what gets through to Chinese
citizens surfing the World Wide Web.
3. The view of surprise and unpredictability in the Anglo-American model are the keys to economic life
because markets are fluid and unpredictable; the Asian-style system deeply mistrusts markets and sees
competition as a useful tool for keeping companies on their toes, but not as a way to resolve how a society
should be run and in what direction its economy should progress. As there are no guarantees that China’s
approach (indeed, the approach taken by highly successful users of ICT) would be successful, it is not
surprising that China might put too much emphasis on emerging technologies.
The view of national borders and an “us-versus-them” concept of the world; people everywhere are xenophobic and
exclusive, but in the Anglo-American model this is thought to be a lamentable, surmountable failing. The Asianstyle model assumes that it is a natural and permanent condition. Since the Asian mentality might be that no one will
look out for their interest, the likelihood for them to pin their hopes on uncertain futures (through technological
investment) is unlikely. Whereas exports produce immediate results, innovation does not and therefore, takes a back
seat.
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